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In quite different ways, these two authors
have made notable and much needed con-
tributions to our understanding of the com-
plexities of inter-American relationships and,
more broadly, the problems involved in de-
veloping relations between big and small
states on some basis other than sheer domi-
nation. Wood provides a study in depth of
the bilateral dealings between the United
States and Latin American countries during
the decade or so before World War II, out
of which evolved the celebrated Good
Neighbor policy of the United States. In
this history, he finds the basis for a guarded
optimism concerning the adequacy of this
political foundation for a system of reason-
ably harmonious and constructive relation-
ships in the Western Hemisphere. Manger’s
book deals with the institutional apparatus
of the inter-American system, the Organiza-
tion of American States, focusing on the
postwar period, and it reflects a deeply
pessimistic view of the state of the neigh-
borhood.
These differences are not so fundamental
as they might seem. The student of foreign
policy, Wood, and the student of interna-
tional organization, Manger (who comes to
his study from long experience as a practic-
ing official of the OAS), are agreed that the
foreign policy of the United States has de-
cisive importance for the multilateral insti-
tutions of Pan America. Manger’s appraisal
of the postwar OAS does not deny Wood’s
hopeful evaluation of the prewar Good
Neighbor policy, but expresses disappoint-
ment at the failure of its promise to reach
fulfillment. Most basically, the two authors
approach their different tasks as perceptive
political analysts, successfully determined to
cut through diplomatic documentation and
formal institutional structures and processes
to the hard political rock of inter-American
relationships. This kind of penetration is suf-
ficiently rare, particularly in the literature
pertaining to Pan America, to warrant three
academic cheers for Wood and Manger.
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I
Wood dips back into the 1920’s, to the
United States intervention in the chaotic
politics of Nicaragua, to demonstrate that
our Good Neighborly renunciation of inter-
vention did not represent merely a burst of
unwonted good will or a surrender under
pressure to demands for moral reforma-
tion, but a wearied reaction to the &dquo;time-
consuming and expensive, difficult and em-
barrassing&dquo; (Wood, 1961, p. 47) tasks
which intervention involved. Latin Ameri-
can pressures and reactions doubtless helped
United States officials to acquire a distaste
for the job, but the shift away from coercive
intervention into Latin American political
affairs ultimately stemmed from the grow-
ing conviction in Washington that the na-
tional interest neither required nor justified
the exertions which such action entailed.
Wood’s analysis of the Cuban experience of
the early Franklin Roosevelt Administration
traces the process by which the new State
Department crew developed the incentive
not to get involved in interventionist esca-
pades, and learned to be wary of varieties
of intermeddling that might lead to the
necessity of intervention.
The Good Neighbor policy involved not
merely abstention from coercive interven-
tion, and a corresponding diminution in
political meddling, but also the development
of techniques of &dquo;pacific protection&dquo; for
private United States interests in Latin
American countries. Wood stresses the point
that the diplomatic apparatus of the United
States in Latin America had traditionally
served largely as a mechanism for the de-
fense of the economic interests of United
States citizens and corporations doing busi-
ness in that area; the State Department
had been a sort of law office representing
United States concerns in their dealings
with Latin governments. He presents de-
tailed analyses of crises of expropriation and
near-expropriation of United States oil prop-
erties in Bolivia, Mexico, and Venezuela,
showing how Washington’s role and attitude
shifted and how the techniques of protec-
tion were altered to fit the spirit of the Good
Neighbor policy.
This analysis of potentially dangerous
conflicts and their handling brings out two
points that may be relevant to a developing
theory of conflict resolution:
1. Amicable settlement of expropriation
controversies was facilitated when the
United States Government shifted its focus
to the national interest. As Wood repeatedly
indicates, the crucial element in this phase
of the evolution of the Good Neighbor policy
was Washington’s recognition of the diver-
gence between the interests of the oil com-
panies and the nation, its determination to
give priority to the latter interests, and its
insistence that the oil companies acquiesce
in the government’s adopting that scheme of
priorities, even though they might not adopt
it themselves. The State Department be-
came a mediator between United States
companies and Latin governments, intent
upon safeguarding the interests of the for-
mer within the limits set by the national
interest in maintaining or developing good
relations with the latter.
This should not be taken to indicate that
international controversies can always be
peacefully resolved if the states involved
consistently take a clear and intelligent view
of their national interests-that the real in-
terests of states are invariably harmonizable.
Nevertheless, it should inspire some caution
regarding the axiom that a system in which
sovereign units pursue their national inter-
ests is doomed by that pursuit to chaotic
conflict. It should arouse some questioning
of the doctrine that national interest orienta-
tion is the root of all international evil, and
that only a ruling concern with the good
of a supranational community can emanci-
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pate the world from strife. The Good Neigh-
bor experience suggests that the transcend-
ence of subnational interests is the crucial
step toward the resolution of international
conflict in some cases.
2. The technical key to the solution of
the cases involving actual expropriation was
the abandonment by the United States of
its customary demand for arbitration of con-
flicting positions regarding financial settle-
ment. Force was eschewed; arbitration was
not insisted upon; resort was had to political
negotiations &dquo;in which the expropriator was
on formally equal terms with the govern-
ment representing the protesting corpora-
tions&dquo; (Wood, p. 329). For the Latin Amer-
ican countries, it was &dquo;a corollary of the
renunciation of intervention that the pro-
cedure of arbitration also disappear in settle-
ment of cases involving the protection of
foreign nationals&dquo; (Wood, p. 236).
Here, indeed, is something for the ideal-
izers of the &dquo;Rule of Law&dquo; to chew onl For
that matter, it is also a tough morsel for
those self-styled realists who identify legal-
ism with moralism and both with a &dquo;soft&dquo;
policy in international affairs. In the com-
mon view, resort to judicial settlement
(whether by an established court or by an
ad hoc tribunal) is the civilized alternative
to the arbitrament of force; to propose
settlement by legal process is to offer evi-
dence of willingness to do the decent, fair,
and just thing. Wood shows, however, that
in the cases described, insistence by the
United States on procedures associated with
the rule of law would have been interpreted
not as a soft position but as a hard, un-
compromising one; Uncle Sam would have
been dubbed not Uncle Softie but Uncle
Shylock. A friendly, reasonable Washington
would not put Latin American governments
in the dock as defendants, but welcome
them to the conference table as equals,
having legitimate interests to uphold against
private North American interests. Getting
away from judicial settlement in these in-
stances meant having the State Department
emancipate itself &dquo;from the legal straitjacket
that for decades had impeded political
settlements and friendly relationships with
Mexico and other Latin American countries&dquo;
(Wood, p. 236). In short, these cases sug,
gest that the rule of law is limited not only
as to attainability, from the standpoint of
the realist, but also as to advisability, from
the standpoint of the idealist. Political settle-
ment of disputes is not always an inferior
substitute which realism decrees must be
accepted; it is sometimes a superior method
which idealism suggests should be preferred.
II
Manger’s book meets a crying need for a
study of the Organization of American
States that is something other than a sight-
seer’s description of its institutional archi-
tecture or an admirer’s rhapsody on its docu-
mentary treasures (Manger, 1961). Manger
presents a useful survey of the evolutionary
process which produced the postwar struc-
ture of the inter-American system, but he is
not overwhelmingly concerned with the
organization’s forms and formalities. He
raises questions as to the meaningfulness of
the OAS and the significance of its opera-
tions, and he comes up unhappily with quite
negative answers. The virtue of this book
is not that Manger’s political analysis is
necessarily unchallengeable, but that it is
political.
The trouble with the OAS is United States
foreign policy; this oversimplifies Manger’s
position somewhat, but does not misstate his
emphasis. As Wood indicates, the United
States policy of the Good Neighbor laid the
foundation for an effective regional organi-
zation. It remains for Manger to argue
that the United States has undermined the
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organization by its postwar policy with re-
spect to Latin America.
This is not really to say that the United
States has reversed itself, or reverted to the
bad old habits of the pre-Good Neighbor
era. Manger criticizes the tendency of the
United States to abjure collective action
within the hemisphere in favor of dealing
bilaterally with Latin American states-
which is to say, in favor of acting unilaterally
toward them. This sort of bilateralism was,
it should be noted, the standard pattern of
the Good Neighbor policy; that policy may
have laid the foundation for possible multi-
lateralism, but it was not itself an expression
of this approach to diplomacy. Manger
cites the revival of thinly concealed inter-
vention by the United States in such cases
as Guatemala and Cuba. Wood’s analysis of
Good Neighborly nonintervention suggests
that it was based upon the interwar convic-
tion that the national interest of the United
States neither demanded nor justified coer-
cive interference in the politics of Latin
American countries; our interventions since
World War II reflect not a change of policy
but, rightly or wrongly, a change in our ap-
praisal of the dictates of national interest in
the new circumstances of the Cold War era.
Manger lays particular emphasis upon the
failure of the United States to gear its eco-
nomic policy to the needs of Latin America,
either in the sense of collaborating to stabi-
lize commodity markets or in the sense of
giving developmental aid. As Wood makes
clear, the successes of the Good Neighbor
policy were largely negative; the experience
of the ’thirties did not provide evidence of
definite prospects for positive, constructive
action by the United States on behalf of the
economic interests of its neighbors. The
Good Neighbor was not a particularly Help-
ful Neighbor, but a Less Domineering and
More Tolerant Neighbor than formerly.
Thus, to a considerable degree, the aspects
of United States policy which Manger con-
siders detrimental to the effectiveness of the
OAS are consistent with the actualities of
the Good Neighbor policy. They represent
a carry-over from that policy, a failure to
transcend its limitations, a failure to realize
the possibilities which it seemed to open up
-but not a sharp deviation from its opera-
tive features.
In any case, whether more largely be-
cause of domineering policy or dominant
position, the United States has a decisive
role in the OAS. Manger’s analysis of the
politics of the organization stresses the North
American-Latin American dualism, the in-
terplay between the One and the Twenty.
He sees some hope that the economic initia-
tives of the Kennedy Administration may
breathe life into the OAS. He leaves no
doubt of his conviction that the basic re-
quirement is for the negatively Good Neigh-
bor to become a positively Helpful Neighbor.
Manger has served us well in opening up
the critical study of the political realities be-
hind the institutional formalities of the inter-
American system.
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